mock of key checking

[proxmark3-svn] / client / cmdhflist.c

//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Copyright (C) Merlok - 2017
//
// This code is licensed to you under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or,
// at your option, any later version. See the LICENSE.txt file for the text of
// the license.
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Command: hf mf list. It shows data from arm buffer.
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

#include "cmdhflist.h"

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include "util.h"
#include "data.h"
#include "ui.h"
#include "iso14443crc.h"
#include "parity.h"
#include "protocols.h"
#include "crapto1/crapto1.h"
#include "mifarehost.h"
#include "mifaredefault.h"


enum MifareAuthSeq {
	masNone,
	masNt,
	masNrAr,
	masAt,
	masAuthComplete,
	masFirstData,
	masData,
	masError,
};
static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState;
static TAuthData AuthData;

void ClearAuthData() {
	AuthData.uid = 0;
	AuthData.nt = 0;
	AuthData.first_auth = true;
}

/**
 * @brief iso14443A_CRC_check Checks CRC in command or response
 * @param isResponse
 * @param data
 * @param len
 * @return  0 : CRC-command, CRC not ok
 *          1 : CRC-command, CRC ok
 *          2 : Not crc-command
 */
uint8_t iso14443A_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
{
	uint8_t b1,b2;

	if(len <= 2) return 2;

	if(isResponse & (len < 6)) return 2;
	
	ComputeCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, data, len-2, &b1, &b2);
	if (b1 != data[len-2] || b2 != data[len-1]) {
		return 0;
	} else {
		return 1;
	}
}

uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
{
	switch(MifareAuthState) {
		case masNone:
		case masError:
			return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len);
		default:
			return 2;
	}
}

void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
{
	switch(cmd[0])
	{
	case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        
		snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); 
		MifareAuthState = masNone;
		break;
	case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{
		// 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor)
		// 93 70 = Select (usage: 9370+5bytes 9320 answer - answer: 1byte SAK)
		if(cmd[1] == 0x70)
		{
			snprintf(exp,size,"SELECT_UID"); break;
		}else
		{
			snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL"); break;
		}
	}
	case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2:{
		//95 20 = Anticollision of cascade level2
		//95 70 = Select of cascade level2
		if(cmd[2] == 0x70)
		{
			snprintf(exp,size,"SELECT_UID-2"); break;
		}else
		{
			snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL-2"); break;
		}
	}
	case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:		
		snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); 
		MifareAuthState = masNone;
		break;
	case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK:	snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK:	snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case ISO14443A_CMD_HALT:		
		snprintf(exp,size,"HALT"); 
		MifareAuthState = masNone;
		break;
	case ISO14443A_CMD_RATS:		snprintf(exp,size,"RATS"); break;
	case MIFARE_CMD_INC:			snprintf(exp,size,"INC(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case MIFARE_CMD_DEC:			snprintf(exp,size,"DEC(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case MIFARE_CMD_RESTORE:		snprintf(exp,size,"RESTORE(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case MIFARE_CMD_TRANSFER:		snprintf(exp,size,"TRANSFER(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case MIFARE_AUTH_KEYA:
		if ( cmdsize > 3) {
			snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH-A(%d)",cmd[1]); 
			MifareAuthState = masNt;
		} else {
			//	case MIFARE_ULEV1_VERSION :  both 0x60.
			snprintf(exp,size,"EV1 VERSION");
		}
		break;
	case MIFARE_AUTH_KEYB:
		MifareAuthState = masNt;
		snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH-B(%d)",cmd[1]); 
		break;
	case MIFARE_MAGICWUPC1:			snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WUPC1"); break;
	case MIFARE_MAGICWUPC2:			snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WUPC2"); break;
	case MIFARE_MAGICWIPEC:			snprintf(exp,size,"MAGIC WIPEC"); break;
	case MIFARE_ULC_AUTH_1:		snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH "); break;
	case MIFARE_ULC_AUTH_2:		snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH_ANSW"); break;
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_AUTH:
		if ( cmdsize == 7 )
			snprintf(exp,size,"PWD-AUTH KEY: 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x", cmd[1], cmd[2], cmd[3], cmd[4] );
		else
			snprintf(exp,size,"PWD-AUTH");
		break;
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_FASTREAD:{
		if ( cmdsize >=3 && cmd[2] <= 0xE6)
			snprintf(exp,size,"READ RANGE (%d-%d)",cmd[1],cmd[2]); 
		else
			snprintf(exp,size,"?");
		break;
	}
	case MIFARE_ULC_WRITE:{
		if ( cmd[1] < 0x21 )
			snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); 
		else
			snprintf(exp,size,"?");
		break;
	}
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_READ_CNT:{
		if ( cmd[1] < 5 )
			snprintf(exp,size,"READ CNT(%d)",cmd[1]);
		else
			snprintf(exp,size,"?");
		break;
	}
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_INCR_CNT:{
		if ( cmd[1] < 5 )
			snprintf(exp,size,"INCR(%d)",cmd[1]);
		else
			snprintf(exp,size,"?");
		break;
	}
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_READSIG:		snprintf(exp,size,"READ_SIG"); break;
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_CHECKTEAR:	snprintf(exp,size,"CHK_TEARING(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
	case MIFARE_ULEV1_VCSL:		snprintf(exp,size,"VCSL"); break;
	default:						snprintf(exp,size,"?"); break;
	}
	return;
}

void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) {
	// get UID
	if (MifareAuthState == masNone) {
		if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
			ClearAuthData();
			AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
		}
		if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2 && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
			ClearAuthData();
			AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
		}
	}
	
	switch(MifareAuthState) {
		case masNt:
			if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
				snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nt %s", (AuthData.first_auth) ? "" : "(enc)");
				MifareAuthState = masNrAr;
				if (AuthData.first_auth)
					AuthData.nt = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
				else
					AuthData.nt_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
					AuthData.nt_enc_par = parity[0];
				return;
			} else {
				MifareAuthState = masError;
			}
			break;
		case masNrAr:
			if (cmdsize == 8 && !isResponse) {
				snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nr ar (enc)");
				MifareAuthState = masAt;
				AuthData.nr_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
				AuthData.ar_enc = bytes_to_num(&cmd[4], 4);
				AuthData.ar_enc_par = parity[0] << 4;
				return;
			} else {
				MifareAuthState = masError;
			}
			break;
		case masAt:
			if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
				snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)");
				MifareAuthState = masAuthComplete;
				AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
				AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0];
				return;
			} else {
				MifareAuthState = masError;
			}
			break;
		default:
			break;
	}
	
	if (!isResponse && ((MifareAuthState == masNone) || (MifareAuthState == masError)))
		annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize);
	
}

bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
	static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1;	
	static uint64_t mfLastKey;
	
	*mfDataLen = 0;
	
	if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) {
		if (traceCrypto1) {
			crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
		}

		MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
		return false;
	}
	
	if (cmdsize > 32)
		return false;
	
	if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
		if (AuthData.first_auth) {
			uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
			uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
			struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1);
			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0);

			uint64_t lfsr = 0;
			crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
			crypto1_destroy(revstate);
			mfLastKey = lfsr;
			PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | probable key:%x%x Prng:%s   ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
				(unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF), 
				validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
				ks2,
				ks3);
			
			AuthData.first_auth = false;

			traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
		} else {
			printf("uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
			
			// check last used key
			if (mfLastKey) {
				if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) {
				};
			}
			
			// check default keys
			for (int defaultKeyCounter = 0; defaultKeyCounter < MifareDefaultKeysSize; defaultKeyCounter++){
				if (NestedCheckKey(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) {
					
					break;
				};
			}
			
			// nested
			if (validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) {
			}
			
			//hardnested
		}
		
		
		
		MifareAuthState = masData;
	}
	
	if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) {
		memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
		mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
		*mfDataLen = cmdsize;
	}
	
	return *mfDataLen > 0;
}

bool NTParityChk(TAuthData *ad, uint32_t ntx) {
	if (
		(oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(ntx >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(ntx >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
		)
		return false;
	
	uint32_t ar = prng_successor(ntx, 64);
	if (
		(oddparity8(ar >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ar & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(ar >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(ar >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
		)
		return false;

	uint32_t at = prng_successor(ntx, 96);
	if (
		(oddparity8(ar & 0xff) ^ (at >> 24 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 4) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 24 & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(at >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (at & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(at >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
		(oddparity8(at >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
		)
		return false;
		
	return true;
}

bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) {
	uint8_t buf[32] = {0};
	struct Crypto1State *pcs;
	
	pcs = crypto1_create(key);
	uint32_t nt1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nt_enc ^ ad->uid, 1) ^ ad->nt_enc;
	uint32_t ar = prng_successor(nt1, 64);
	uint32_t at = prng_successor(nt1, 96);
	printf("key> nested auth uid: %08x nt: %08x nt_parity: %s ar: %08x at: %08x\n", ad->uid, nt1, printBitsPar(&ad->nt_enc_par, 4), ar, at);
	uint32_t nr1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1) ^ ad->nr_enc;
	uint32_t ar1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->ar_enc;
	uint32_t at1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->at_enc;
	printf("key> the same key test. nr1: %08x ar1: %08x at1: %08x \n", nr1, ar1, at1);

	if (NTParityChk(ad, nt1))
		printf("key> the same key test OK. key=%x%x\n", (unsigned int)((key & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(key & 0xFFFFFFFF));
	else {
		printf("key> the same key test. check nt parity error.\n");
		return false;
	}

	memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize);
	mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0);
	
	return CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, buf, cmdsize);
}