+
+bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
+ static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1;
+ uint64_t mfLastKey;
+
+ *mfDataLen = 0;
+
+ if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) {
+ if (traceCrypto1) {
+ crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
+ }
+
+ MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (cmdsize > 32)
+ return false;
+
+ if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
+ if (AuthData.first_auth) {
+ uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
+ uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
+ struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+ lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+ lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+ lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1);
+ lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0);
+
+ uint64_t lfsr = 0;
+ crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
+ crypto1_destroy(revstate);
+ mfLastKey = lfsr;
+ PrintAndLog(" | * | key | probable key:%x%x Prng:%s ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |",
+ (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF),
+ validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
+ ks2,
+ ks3);
+
+ AuthData.first_auth = false;
+
+ traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+ } else {
+ printf("uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
+
+ // check last used key
+ if (mfLastKey) {
+
+ }
+
+ // check default keys
+
+ // nested
+ if (validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) {
+ }
+
+ //hardnested
+ }
+
+
+
+ MifareAuthState = masData;
+ }
+
+ if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) {
+ memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
+ mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
+ *mfDataLen = cmdsize;
+ }
+
+ return *mfDataLen > 0;
+}
+