]> git.zerfleddert.de Git - proxmark3-svn/blobdiff - client/cmdhflist.c
added some cone in nested. not tested.
[proxmark3-svn] / client / cmdhflist.c
index ec710b2c24d55d0a220d01809a7247b09c3832d0..06bd8d18deb47288ba0b3da585d0039413f53c9c 100644 (file)
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 #include "iso14443crc.h"
 #include "parity.h"
 #include "protocols.h"
+#include "crapto1/crapto1.h"
+#include "mifarehost.h"
+#include "mifaredefault.h"
 
 
 enum MifareAuthSeq {
@@ -28,9 +31,9 @@ enum MifareAuthSeq {
        masNt,
        masNrAr,
        masAt,
+       masAuthComplete,
        masFirstData,
        masData,
-       masDataNested,
        masError,
 };
 static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState;
@@ -39,7 +42,7 @@ static TAuthData AuthData;
 void ClearAuthData() {
        AuthData.uid = 0;
        AuthData.nt = 0;
-       AuthData.first_auth = false;
+       AuthData.first_auth = true;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -71,9 +74,6 @@ uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
 {
        switch(MifareAuthState) {
                case masNone:
-               case masFirstData:
-               case masData:
-               case masDataNested:
                case masError:
                        return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len);
                default:
@@ -85,7 +85,10 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
 {
        switch(cmd[0])
        {
-       case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); break;
+       case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        
+               snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); 
+               MifareAuthState = masNone;
+               break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{
                // 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor)
                // 93 70 = Select (usage: 9370+5bytes 9320 answer - answer: 1byte SAK)
@@ -108,7 +111,10 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
                        snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL-2"); break;
                }
        }
-       case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:                snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); break;
+       case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:                
+               snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); 
+               MifareAuthState = masNone;
+               break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK:   snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK:  snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_HALT:                
@@ -180,14 +186,14 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
        return;
 }
 
-void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse) {
+void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) {
        // get UID
        if (MifareAuthState == masNone) {
-               if (cmdsize == 7 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
+               if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
                        ClearAuthData();
                        AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
                }
-               if (cmdsize == 7 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2 && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
+               if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2 && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
                        ClearAuthData();
                        AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4);
                }
@@ -199,9 +205,10 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool
                                snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nt %s", (AuthData.first_auth) ? "" : "(enc)");
                                MifareAuthState = masNrAr;
                                if (AuthData.first_auth)
-                                       AuthData.nt = bytes_to_num(cmd, cmdsize);
+                                       AuthData.nt = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
                                else
-                                       AuthData.nt_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, cmdsize);
+                                       AuthData.nt_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
+                                       AuthData.nt_enc_par = parity[0];
                                return;
                        } else {
                                MifareAuthState = masError;
@@ -211,8 +218,9 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool
                        if (cmdsize == 8 && !isResponse) {
                                snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nr ar (enc)");
                                MifareAuthState = masAt;
-                               AuthData.nr_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, cmdsize);
-                               AuthData.ar_enc = bytes_to_num(&cmd[3], cmdsize);
+                               AuthData.nr_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
+                               AuthData.ar_enc = bytes_to_num(&cmd[4], 4);
+                               AuthData.ar_enc_par = parity[0] << 4;
                                return;
                        } else {
                                MifareAuthState = masError;
@@ -221,8 +229,9 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool
                case masAt:
                        if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
                                snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)");
-                               MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
-                               AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, cmdsize);
+                               MifareAuthState = masAuthComplete;
+                               AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
+                               AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0];
                                return;
                        } else {
                                MifareAuthState = masError;
@@ -232,7 +241,169 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool
                        break;
        }
        
-       if (!isResponse)
+       if (!isResponse && ((MifareAuthState == masNone) || (MifareAuthState == masError)))
                annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize);
        
 }
+
+bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
+       static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1;       
+       static uint64_t mfLastKey;
+       
+       *mfDataLen = 0;
+       
+       if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) {
+               if (traceCrypto1) {
+                       crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
+               }
+
+               MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
+               return false;
+       }
+       
+       if (cmdsize > 32)
+               return false;
+       
+       if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
+               if (AuthData.first_auth) {
+                       uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
+                       uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
+                       struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1);
+                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0);
+
+                       uint64_t lfsr = 0;
+                       crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
+                       crypto1_destroy(revstate);
+                       mfLastKey = lfsr;
+                       PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | probable key:%x%x Prng:%s   ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
+                               (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF), 
+                               validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
+                               ks2,
+                               ks3);
+                       
+                       AuthData.first_auth = false;
+
+                       traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+               } else {
+                       printf("uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
+                       
+                       // check last used key
+                       if (mfLastKey) {
+                               if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) {
+                               };
+                       }
+                       
+                       // check default keys
+                       if (!traceCrypto1) {
+                               for (int defaultKeyCounter = 0; defaultKeyCounter < MifareDefaultKeysSize; defaultKeyCounter++){
+                                       if (NestedCheckKey(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) {
+                                               
+                                               break;
+                                       };
+                               }
+                       }
+                       
+                       // nested
+                       if (!traceCrypto1 && validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) {
+                               uint32_t ntx = prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 90);
+                               for (int i = 0; i < 16383; i++) {
+                                       ntx = prng_successor(ntx, 1);
+                                       if (NTParityChk(&AuthData, ntx)){
+
+                                               uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 64);
+                                               uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 96);
+                                               struct Crypto1State *pcs = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+                                               memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
+                                               mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
+                               
+                                               crypto1_destroy(pcs);
+                                               if (CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, mfData, cmdsize)) {
+                                                       traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+                                                       break;
+                                               }
+                                       }                                               
+                               }
+                               if (traceCrypto1)
+                                       printf("key> nt=%08x nonce distance=%d \n", ntx, nonce_distance(AuthData.nt, ntx));
+                               else
+                                       printf("key> don't have any valid nt( \n");                                     
+                       }
+                       
+                       //hardnested
+                       if (!traceCrypto1) {
+                       }
+               }
+               
+               
+               
+               MifareAuthState = masData;
+       }
+       
+       if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) {
+               memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
+               mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
+               *mfDataLen = cmdsize;
+       }
+       
+       return *mfDataLen > 0;
+}
+
+bool NTParityChk(TAuthData *ad, uint32_t ntx) {
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+       
+       uint32_t ar = prng_successor(ntx, 64);
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ar & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+
+       uint32_t at = prng_successor(ntx, 96);
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ar & 0xff) ^ (at >> 24 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 4) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 24 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (at & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+               
+       return true;
+}
+
+bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) {
+       uint8_t buf[32] = {0};
+       struct Crypto1State *pcs;
+       
+       pcs = crypto1_create(key);
+       uint32_t nt1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nt_enc ^ ad->uid, 1) ^ ad->nt_enc;
+       uint32_t ar = prng_successor(nt1, 64);
+       uint32_t at = prng_successor(nt1, 96);
+       printf("key> nested auth uid: %08x nt: %08x nt_parity: %s ar: %08x at: %08x\n", ad->uid, nt1, printBitsPar(&ad->nt_enc_par, 4), ar, at);
+       uint32_t nr1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1) ^ ad->nr_enc;
+       uint32_t ar1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->ar_enc;
+       uint32_t at1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->at_enc;
+       printf("key> the same key test. nr1: %08x ar1: %08x at1: %08x \n", nr1, ar1, at1);
+
+       if (NTParityChk(ad, nt1))
+               printf("key> the same key test OK. key=%x%x\n", (unsigned int)((key & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(key & 0xFFFFFFFF));
+       else {
+               printf("key> the same key test. check nt parity error.\n");
+               return false;
+       }
+
+       memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize);
+       mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0);
+       
+       crypto1_destroy(pcs);
+       
+       return CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, buf, cmdsize);
+}
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