X-Git-Url: http://git.zerfleddert.de/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi/proxmark3-svn/blobdiff_plain/6612a5a20136d0d4b11bd7f3fd113f4dd836119f..856da9a1c081abedef9af96220723eb1031f49e2:/client/cmdhflist.c diff --git a/client/cmdhflist.c b/client/cmdhflist.c index b1d432ee..64ffed5c 100644 --- a/client/cmdhflist.c +++ b/client/cmdhflist.c @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ #include "iso14443crc.h" #include "parity.h" #include "protocols.h" +#include "crapto1/crapto1.h" +#include "mifarehost.h" +#include "mifaredefault.h" enum MifareAuthSeq { @@ -28,11 +31,21 @@ enum MifareAuthSeq { masNt, masNrAr, masAt, + masAuthComplete, + masFirstData, masData, - masDataNested, masError, }; static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState; +static TAuthData AuthData; + +void ClearAuthData() { + AuthData.uid = 0; + AuthData.nt = 0; + AuthData.first_auth = true; + AuthData.ks2 = 0; + AuthData.ks3 = 0; +} /** * @brief iso14443A_CRC_check Checks CRC in command or response @@ -63,21 +76,21 @@ uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len) { switch(MifareAuthState) { case masNone: - case masData: - case masDataNested: case masError: return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len); default: return 2; } - } void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) { switch(cmd[0]) { - case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA: snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); break; + case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA: + snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); + MifareAuthState = masNone; + break; case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{ // 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor) // 93 70 = Select (usage: 9370+5bytes 9320 answer - answer: 1byte SAK) @@ -100,7 +113,10 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) snprintf(exp,size,"ANTICOLL-2"); break; } } - case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA: snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); break; + case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA: + snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); + MifareAuthState = masNone; + break; case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK: snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break; case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK: snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break; case ISO14443A_CMD_HALT: @@ -172,32 +188,52 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) return; } -void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse) { +void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) { + // get UID + if (MifareAuthState == masNone) { + if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) { + ClearAuthData(); + AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4); + } + if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT_2 && cmd[1] == 0x70) { + ClearAuthData(); + AuthData.uid = bytes_to_num(&cmd[2], 4); + } + } + switch(MifareAuthState) { case masNt: - if (cmdsize == 4) { - snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nt"); + if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) { + snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nt %s", (AuthData.first_auth) ? "" : "(enc)"); MifareAuthState = masNrAr; - printf("--ntok\n"); + if (AuthData.first_auth) + AuthData.nt = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4); + else + AuthData.nt_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4); + AuthData.nt_enc_par = parity[0]; return; } else { MifareAuthState = masError; - printf("--err %d\n", cmdsize); } break; case masNrAr: - if (cmdsize == 8) { - snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nr ar"); + if (cmdsize == 8 && !isResponse) { + snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: nr ar (enc)"); MifareAuthState = masAt; + AuthData.nr_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4); + AuthData.ar_enc = bytes_to_num(&cmd[4], 4); + AuthData.ar_enc_par = parity[0] << 4; return; } else { MifareAuthState = masError; } break; case masAt: - if (cmdsize == 4) { - snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at"); - MifareAuthState = masData; + if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) { + snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)"); + MifareAuthState = masAuthComplete; + AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4); + AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0]; return; } else { MifareAuthState = masError; @@ -207,7 +243,178 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool break; } - if (!isResponse) + if (!isResponse && ((MifareAuthState == masNone) || (MifareAuthState == masError))) annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize); } + +bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) { + static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1; + static uint64_t mfLastKey; + + *mfDataLen = 0; + + if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) { + if (traceCrypto1) { + crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1); + } + + MifareAuthState = masFirstData; + return false; + } + + if (cmdsize > 32) + return false; + + if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) { + if (AuthData.first_auth) { + AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64); + AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96); + struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3); + lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0); + lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0); + lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1); + lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0); + + uint64_t lfsr = 0; + crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr); + crypto1_destroy(revstate); + mfLastKey = lfsr; + PrintAndLog(" | * | key | probable key:%x%x Prng:%s ks2:%08x ks3:%08x | |", + (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF), + validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD", + AuthData.ks2, + AuthData.ks3); + + AuthData.first_auth = false; + + traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3); + } else { + printf("uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc); + + // check last used key + if (mfLastKey) { + if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) { + traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3); + }; + } + + // check default keys + if (!traceCrypto1) { + for (int defaultKeyCounter = 0; defaultKeyCounter < MifareDefaultKeysSize; defaultKeyCounter++){ + if (NestedCheckKey(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize)) { + traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3); + break; + }; + } + } + + // nested + if (!traceCrypto1 && validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) { + uint32_t ntx = prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 90); + for (int i = 0; i < 16383; i++) { + ntx = prng_successor(ntx, 1); + if (NTParityChk(&AuthData, ntx)){ + + uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 64); + uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 96); + struct Crypto1State *pcs = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3); + memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize); + mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0); + + crypto1_destroy(pcs); + if (CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, mfData, cmdsize)) { + AuthData.ks2 = ks2; + AuthData.ks3 = ks3; + traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3); + break; + } + } + } + if (traceCrypto1) + printf("key> nt=%08x nonce distance=%d \n", ntx, nonce_distance(AuthData.nt, ntx)); + else + printf("key> don't have any valid nt( \n"); + } + + //hardnested + if (!traceCrypto1) { + } + } + + + + MifareAuthState = masData; + } + + if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) { + memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize); + mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0); + *mfDataLen = cmdsize; + } + + return *mfDataLen > 0; +} + +bool NTParityChk(TAuthData *ad, uint32_t ntx) { + if ( + (oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(ntx >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(ntx >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 16 & 0x01)) + ) + return false; + + uint32_t ar = prng_successor(ntx, 64); + if ( + (oddparity8(ar >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ar & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(ar >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(ar >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 16 & 0x01)) + ) + return false; + + uint32_t at = prng_successor(ntx, 96); + if ( + (oddparity8(ar & 0xff) ^ (at >> 24 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 4) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 24 & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(at >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (at & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(at >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) || + (oddparity8(at >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 16 & 0x01)) + ) + return false; + + return true; +} + +bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize) { + uint8_t buf[32] = {0}; + struct Crypto1State *pcs; + + pcs = crypto1_create(key); + uint32_t nt1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nt_enc ^ ad->uid, 1) ^ ad->nt_enc; + uint32_t ar = prng_successor(nt1, 64); + uint32_t at = prng_successor(nt1, 96); + printf("key> nested auth uid: %08x nt: %08x nt_parity: %s ar: %08x at: %08x\n", ad->uid, nt1, printBitsPar(&ad->nt_enc_par, 4), ar, at); + uint32_t nr1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1) ^ ad->nr_enc; + uint32_t ar1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->ar_enc; + uint32_t at1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->at_enc; + printf("key> the same key test. nr1: %08x ar1: %08x at1: %08x \n", nr1, ar1, at1); + + if (NTParityChk(ad, nt1)) + printf("key> the same key test OK. key=%x%x\n", (unsigned int)((key & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(key & 0xFFFFFFFF)); + else { + printf("key> the same key test. check nt parity error.\n"); + return false; + } + + memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize); + mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0); + + crypto1_destroy(pcs); + + if(CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, buf, cmdsize)) { + AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ ar; + AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ at; + return true; + } else { + return false; + } +} \ No newline at end of file