X-Git-Url: http://git.zerfleddert.de/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi/proxmark3-svn/blobdiff_plain/77aecdd2865d4b2dcb7d231c125920820081a7b9..d86ee73da53a701b3e47de9eb2a047c6bf0b0bd1:/client/mifarehost.c

diff --git a/client/mifarehost.c b/client/mifarehost.c
index 629c8feb..b6eb60f0 100644
--- a/client/mifarehost.c
+++ b/client/mifarehost.c
@@ -178,12 +178,14 @@ int mfDarkside(uint64_t *key)
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		qsort(keylist, keycount, sizeof(*keylist), compare_uint64);
-		keycount = intersection(last_keylist, keylist);
-		if (keycount == 0) {
-			free(last_keylist);
-			last_keylist = keylist;
-			continue;
+		if (par_list == 0) {
+			qsort(keylist, keycount, sizeof(*keylist), compare_uint64);
+			keycount = intersection(last_keylist, keylist);
+			if (keycount == 0) {
+				free(last_keylist);
+				last_keylist = keylist;
+				continue;
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (keycount > 1) {
@@ -198,10 +200,10 @@ int mfDarkside(uint64_t *key)
 		for (int i = 0; i < keycount; i += max_keys) {
 			int size = keycount - i > max_keys ? max_keys : keycount - i;
 			for (int j = 0; j < size; j++) {
-				if (last_keylist == NULL) {
-					num_to_bytes(keylist[i*max_keys + j], 6, keyBlock);
-				} else {
+				if (par_list == 0) {
 					num_to_bytes(last_keylist[i*max_keys + j], 6, keyBlock);
+				} else {
+					num_to_bytes(keylist[i*max_keys + j], 6, keyBlock);
 				}
 			}
 			if (!mfCheckKeys(0, 0, false, size, keyBlock, key)) {
@@ -228,17 +230,46 @@ int mfCheckKeys (uint8_t blockNo, uint8_t keyType, bool clear_trace, uint8_t key
 
 	*key = -1;
 
-	UsbCommand c = {CMD_MIFARE_CHKKEYS, {((blockNo & 0xff) | ((keyType&0xff)<<8)), clear_trace, keycnt}};
+	UsbCommand c = {CMD_MIFARE_CHKKEYS, {((blockNo & 0xff) | ((keyType & 0xff) << 8)), clear_trace, keycnt}}; 
 	memcpy(c.d.asBytes, keyBlock, 6 * keycnt);
 	SendCommand(&c);
 
 	UsbCommand resp;
-	if (!WaitForResponseTimeout(CMD_ACK,&resp,3000)) return 1;
+	if (!WaitForResponseTimeout(CMD_ACK,&resp,3000)) return 1; 
 	if ((resp.arg[0] & 0xff) != 0x01) return 2;
 	*key = bytes_to_num(resp.d.asBytes, 6);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int mfCheckKeysSec(uint8_t sectorCnt, uint8_t keyType, uint8_t timeout14a, bool clear_trace, uint8_t keycnt, uint8_t * keyBlock, sector_t * e_sector){
+
+	uint8_t keyPtr = 0;
+
+	if (e_sector == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	UsbCommand c = {CMD_MIFARE_CHKKEYS, {((sectorCnt & 0xff) | ((keyType & 0xff) << 8)), (clear_trace | 0x02)|((timeout14a & 0xff) << 8), keycnt}}; 
+	memcpy(c.d.asBytes, keyBlock, 6 * keycnt);
+	SendCommand(&c);
+
+	UsbCommand resp;
+	if (!WaitForResponseTimeoutW(CMD_ACK, &resp, MAX(3000, 1000 + 13 * sectorCnt * keycnt * (keyType == 2 ? 2 : 1)), false)) return 1; // timeout: 13 ms / fail auth
+	if ((resp.arg[0] & 0xff) != 0x01) return 2;
+	
+	bool foundAKey = false;
+	for(int sec = 0; sec < sectorCnt; sec++){
+		for(int keyAB = 0; keyAB < 2; keyAB++){
+			keyPtr = *(resp.d.asBytes + keyAB * 40 + sec);
+			if (keyPtr){
+				e_sector[sec].foundKey[keyAB] = true;
+				e_sector[sec].Key[keyAB] = bytes_to_num(keyBlock + (keyPtr - 1) * 6, 6);
+				foundAKey = true;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return foundAKey ? 0 : 3;
+}
+
 // Compare 16 Bits out of cryptostate
 int Compare16Bits(const void * a, const void * b) {
 	if ((*(uint64_t*)b & 0x00ff000000ff0000) == (*(uint64_t*)a & 0x00ff000000ff0000)) return 0;
@@ -511,36 +542,12 @@ int mfCSetUID(uint8_t *uid, uint8_t *atqa, uint8_t *sak, uint8_t *oldUID) {
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mfCIdentify()
-{
-	UsbCommand c = {CMD_READER_ISO_14443a, {ISO14A_CONNECT | ISO14A_NO_DISCONNECT, 0, 0}};
+int mfCIdentify() {
+	UsbCommand c = {CMD_MIFARE_CIDENT, {0, 0, 0}};
 	SendCommand(&c);
-
 	UsbCommand resp;
 	WaitForResponse(CMD_ACK,&resp);
 
-	// iso14a_card_select_t card;
-	// memcpy(&card, (iso14a_card_select_t *)resp.d.asBytes, sizeof(iso14a_card_select_t));
-
-	// uint64_t select_status = resp.arg[0];		// 0: couldn't read, 1: OK, with ATS, 2: OK, no ATS, 3: proprietary Anticollision
-
-	// if(select_status != 0) {
-		// uint8_t rats[] = { 0xE0, 0x80 }; // FSDI=8 (FSD=256), CID=0
-		// c.arg[0] = ISO14A_RAW | ISO14A_APPEND_CRC | ISO14A_NO_DISCONNECT;
-		// c.arg[1] = 2;
-		// c.arg[2] = 0;
-		// memcpy(c.d.asBytes, rats, 2);
-		// SendCommand(&c);
-		// WaitForResponse(CMD_ACK,&resp);
-	// }
-
-	c.cmd = CMD_MIFARE_CIDENT;
-	c.arg[0] = 0;
-	c.arg[1] = 0;
-	c.arg[2] = 0;
-	SendCommand(&c);
-	WaitForResponse(CMD_ACK,&resp);
-
 	uint8_t isGeneration = resp.arg[0] & 0xff;
 	switch( isGeneration ){
 		case 1: PrintAndLog("Chinese magic backdoor commands (GEN 1a) detected"); break;
@@ -548,13 +555,6 @@ int mfCIdentify()
 		default: PrintAndLog("No chinese magic backdoor command detected"); break;
 	}
 
-	// disconnect
-	c.cmd = CMD_READER_ISO_14443a;
-	c.arg[0] = 0;
-	c.arg[1] = 0;
-	c.arg[2] = 0;
-	SendCommand(&c);
-
 	return (int) isGeneration;
 }
 
@@ -611,7 +611,8 @@ int saveTraceCard(void) {
 	for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++) {  // blocks
 		for (int j = 0; j < 16; j++)  // bytes
 			fprintf(f, "%02x", *(traceCard + i * 16 + j));
-		fprintf(f,"\n");
+		if (i < 63)
+			fprintf(f,"\n");
 	}
 	fclose(f);
 	return 0;
@@ -828,20 +829,30 @@ int mfTraceDecode(uint8_t *data_src, int len, bool wantSaveToEmlFile) {
 		if (len ==4) {
 			traceState = TRACE_IDLE;
 
-			at_enc = bytes_to_num(data, 4);
-
-			//  decode key here)
-			ks2 = ar_enc ^ prng_successor(nt, 64);
-			ks3 = at_enc ^ prng_successor(nt, 96);
-			revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
-			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
-			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
-			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, nr_enc, 1);
-			lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, uid ^ nt, 0);
+			if (!traceCrypto1) {
+				at_enc = bytes_to_num(data, 4);
+
+				//  decode key here)
+				ks2 = ar_enc ^ prng_successor(nt, 64);
+				ks3 = at_enc ^ prng_successor(nt, 96);
+				revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+				lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+				lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+				lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, nr_enc, 1);
+				lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, uid ^ nt, 0);
+
+				crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
+				printf("key> %x%x\n", (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF));
+				AddLogUint64(logHexFileName, "key> ", lfsr);
+			} else {
+				printf("key> nested not implemented!\n");
+				at_enc = bytes_to_num(data, 4);
+				
+				crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
 
-			crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
-			printf("key> %x%x\n", (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF));
-			AddLogUint64(logHexFileName, "key> ", lfsr);
+				// not implemented
+				traceState = TRACE_ERROR;
+			}
 
 			int blockShift = ((traceCurBlock & 0xFC) + 3) * 16;
 			if (isBlockEmpty((traceCurBlock & 0xFC) + 3)) memcpy(traceCard + blockShift + 6, trailerAccessBytes, 4);
@@ -859,15 +870,6 @@ int mfTraceDecode(uint8_t *data_src, int len, bool wantSaveToEmlFile) {
 
 			// set cryptosystem state
 			traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
-
-//	nt = crypto1_word(traceCrypto1, nt ^ uid, 1) ^ nt;
-
-	/*	traceCrypto1 = crypto1_create(lfsr); // key in lfsr
-		crypto1_word(traceCrypto1, nt ^ uid, 0);
-		crypto1_word(traceCrypto1, ar, 1);
-		crypto1_word(traceCrypto1, 0, 0);
-		crypto1_word(traceCrypto1, 0, 0);*/
-
 			return 0;
 		} else {
 			traceState = TRACE_ERROR;
@@ -905,3 +907,72 @@ int tryDecryptWord(uint32_t nt, uint32_t ar_enc, uint32_t at_enc, uint8_t *data,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/** validate_prng_nonce
+ * Determine if nonce is deterministic. ie: Suspectable to Darkside attack.
+ * returns
+ *   true = weak prng
+ *   false = hardend prng
+ */
+bool validate_prng_nonce(uint32_t nonce) {
+	uint16_t *dist = 0;
+	uint16_t x, i;
+
+	dist = malloc(2 << 16);
+	if(!dist)
+		return -1;
+
+	// init prng table:
+	for (x = i = 1; i; ++i) {
+		dist[(x & 0xff) << 8 | x >> 8] = i;
+		x = x >> 1 | (x ^ x >> 2 ^ x >> 3 ^ x >> 5) << 15;
+	}
+	
+	uint32_t res = (65535 - dist[nonce >> 16] + dist[nonce & 0xffff]) % 65535;
+	
+	free(dist);	
+	return (res == 16);
+}
+
+/* Detect Tag Prng, 
+* function performs a partial AUTH,  where it tries to authenticate against block0, key A, but only collects tag nonce.
+* the tag nonce is check to see if it has a predictable PRNG.
+* @returns 
+*	TRUE if tag uses WEAK prng (ie Now the NACK bug also needs to be present for Darkside attack)
+*   FALSE is tag uses HARDEND prng (ie hardnested attack possible, with known key)
+*/
+int DetectClassicPrng(void){
+
+	UsbCommand resp, respA;	
+	uint8_t cmd[] = {0x60, 0x00}; // MIFARE_AUTH_KEYA
+	uint32_t flags = ISO14A_CONNECT | ISO14A_RAW | ISO14A_APPEND_CRC | ISO14A_NO_RATS;
+	
+	UsbCommand c = {CMD_READER_ISO_14443a, {flags, sizeof(cmd), 0}};
+	memcpy(c.d.asBytes, cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+
+	clearCommandBuffer();
+	SendCommand(&c);
+	if (!WaitForResponseTimeout(CMD_ACK, &resp, 2000)) {
+        PrintAndLog("PRNG UID: Reply timeout.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	// if select tag failed.
+	if (resp.arg[0] == 0) {
+		PrintAndLog("PRNG error: selecting tag failed, can't detect prng.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	if (!WaitForResponseTimeout(CMD_ACK, &respA, 5000)) {
+        PrintAndLog("PRNG data: Reply timeout.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	// check respA
+	if (respA.arg[0] != 4) {
+		PrintAndLog("PRNG data error: Wrong length: %d", respA.arg[0]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	uint32_t nonce = bytes_to_num(respA.d.asBytes, respA.arg[0]);
+	return validate_prng_nonce(nonce);
+}